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ABSTRACT
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Muslim countries were occupied by Western powers that came across the local 
Muslim culture and traditions. The Muslim world at that time was thrown into great crisis caused by the conflict between 
conservatism and modernism. The conservatives became rigid in their outlook and approach. They concluded that the only 
way to save Muslim society in the conflict of the West was to stick to the past and guard the old establishment. Meanwhile, 
the modernists confined themselves to the imitation of the West, and argued for the adoption of Western civilization, 
so that Muslim could emerge as a progressive nation. While the conservatives stood for rigid adherence to fiqh, the 
modernists wanted to change the entire law in the light of Western codes of law. Iqbal argued that neither conservatism 
nor modernism was good. According to him, the conservatives’ approach was unrealistic because it rejects the ontological 
principle of change; i.e due to a process of continuous change of life, new situations arise and new problems occur. 
Meanwhile, the modernists’ approach is unrealistic because it has often ended up in the garb of westernization rather 
than modernization. Iqbal took a balance approach between conservatism and modernism whereby he acknowledged 
conservatives’ approach which firmly anchored in the Muslim heritage, and the modernists’ approach which tailored to 
meet the challenge of modern times to maintain the dynamic character of Islam. In his balance approach, Iqbal tried 
to reinterpret Islamic thought through the principle of ijtihad, and stressed its dynamic element in it rather than static. 
For Iqbal, ijtihad was the only way to rescue Muslims from the stagnation of thought. This paper attempts at analyzing 
Iqbal’s constructive approach to the principle of ijtihad, and its significance to contemporary Islam.
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ABSTRAK
Di dalam abad ke sembilan belas dan dua puluh, negara-negara Muslim telah ditakluki oleh kuasa-kuasa barat. Kesan 
di atas penaklukan ini, dunia Islam ketika itu dilanda krisis pemikiran iaitu konflik di antara golongan konservatif dan 
modernis. Golongan konservatif berfikiran sempit dan mempunyai pendekatan yang sangat rigid. Mereka beranggapan 
bahawa masyarakat Muslim mesti mempertahankan tradisi lama untuk menyelamatkan mereka daripada pengaruh 
Barat. Manakala, golongan modernis pula menolak tradisi lama. Mereka terlalu mengikut budaya dan tamadun Barat 
dan menerimanya secara total. Mereka menganggap bahawa masyarakat Muslim mampu menjadi maju dan progresif 
dengan mengikuti cara pendekatan Barat. Golongan konservatif berpegang kepada pendekatan yang rigid terhadap 
undang-undang fiqh manakala golongan modernis pula ingin mengubahnya secara keseluruhan dengan menggunakan 
akta undang-undang Barat. Iqbal menegaskan bahawa pendekatan kedua-dua golongan tersebut adalah tidak benar. 
Menurut beliau, pendekatan golongan konservatif tidak realistik kerana ia menolak proses perubahan di dalam kehidupan 
manusia di mana berlaku situasi dan masalah-masalah baru yang tidak wujud di zaman terdahulu dan memerlukan 
pendekatan baharu. Manakala pendekatan modernis juga tidak realistik kerana ia akhirnya terjerumus ke dalam acuan 
kebaratan dan bukannya kemodenan yang sebenar. Justeru, Iqbal mengambil pendekatan yang seimbang di antara dua 
golongan tersebut. Beliau mengakui pendekatan konservatif yang berpegang teguh kepada tradisi Muslim terdahulu; 
dan beliau juga mengiktiraf pendekatan modernis yang ingin menonjolkan Islam yang dinamik. Melalui pendekatan 
yang seimbang di antara dua golongan di atas, Iqbal cuba mentafsirkan pemikiran Islam melalui prinsip ijtihad dan 
menekankan unsur dinamik di dalamnya. Bagi Iqbal, ijtihad merupakan satu cara untuk menyelamatkan Muslim daripada 
kebekuan pemikiran. Kertas kerja ini cuba menganalisa pendekatan Iqbal yang membina terhadap prinsip ijtihad dan 
kepentingannya kepada Islam masa kini.
Kata kunci: Iqbal; pemikiran Islam; undang-undang Islam; Ijtihad; Shura
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INTRODUCTION
Muhammad Iqbal was born at Sialkot on 9th 
November 1877 (Hafeez Malik and Lynda P. Malik 
1971), of a middle-class and deeply religious family. 
He grew up at a time when Western civilization 
was imposing a comprehensive dominance over 
the Muslim world and the Muslim world was 
suffering a long time of decline in all aspects – 
political, cultural, economic, and social life. The 
decline of the Muslim ummah, according to Iqbal, 
was primarily due to the stagnation of religious 
thought. Therefore, he proposed the need for the 
reconstruction of religious thought both in sphere of 
theology as well as in law and jurisprudence. Iqbal 
emphasized that the only way to rescue Muslims 
from that stagnation is through the application of 
the principle of ijtihad. 
Ijtihad was exercised from the earliest days of 
Islam. Some learned companions of the Prophet 
(p.b.u.h) such as Abu Bakr, Umar, Ali, and many 
others exercised ijtihad in matters which had no 
specific solutions in the Quran and the Sunnah. 
Starting from this early practice, ijtihad then was 
used extensively by the four great scholars of 
Muslim jurisprudence in the second century of 
hijrah. The sphere of ijtihad at that time was very 
wide. It covered all the aspects of religious, political, 
and civil life, including the whole field of family 
laws, the laws of inheritance, and all legal questions 
that arose in social life. In early years of the growth 
of Islamic law, any jurist who possessed the requisite 
qualifications was deemed to be competent to 
exercise ijtihad. However, in the third century of 
hijrah, increasing restrictions were imposed, and 
the four schools of jurisprudence were regarded 
as fully developed. This resulted in the closing of 
the doors of ijtihad. Thus, after the third century of 
hijrah, ijtihad completely disappeared as a practical 
intellectual force in Islam. The closing of the doors 
of ijtihad is considered as one of greatest intellectual 
disasters in the development of Islamic thought. It 
prevents the advancement of the Muslims in social, 
political, and legal avenues of Islam. Therefore, 
Iqbal tried to revive ijtihad and to bring back this 
dynamic element of Islamic civilization. 
IQBAL’S FRAMEWORK OF IJTIHAD
Iqbal observed that no law or institution can be truly 
Islamic unless it imbibes the spirit of the dynamic 
outlook of the Quran. Islamic civilization, according 
to him, has lost this dynamic element due to certain 
historical events (Gustav Edmund Von Grunebaum 
1995). Following the footstep of great revivalists, 
such as, Ibn Taymiyyah, Shah Wali Allah and other 
modernists in Egypt, Turkey and the subcontinent, 
Iqbal protested against the traditional formulation of 
theological dogma and emphasized that we have to 
reevaluate our intellectual inheritance which involves 
exercising the right of ijtihad (Iqbal 1982). Iqbal 
highlighted few dynamic elements which constitute 
his principle of ijtihad, the dynamic concept of the 
universe, society, and culture in Islam, the idea of 
changeability of life, the truth of juristic reasoning 
in Islam, and the evolutionary and dynamic concept 
of the intellect and thought in Islam (Muhammad 
Khalid Mas’ud 1995).
Iqbal elaborates his views on ijtihad in his 
poetry, letters, and lectures. However, he discussed 
the subject in a comprehensive manner in the 
sixth lecture of his Reconstruction entitled “The 
Principle Movement in the Structure of Islam” in 
which some authors translated it as ijtihad. He looks 
into the subject in the historical and the modern 
perspective. Before highlighting his views on the 
principle of ijtihad and its methods of applications, 
Iqbal mentioned three causes for the decay of 
ijtihad among the Muslims; first, the adherence 
of the Muslim community to extreme positions. 
During the age of the Abbasids, the rise of rationalist 
movements, such as, mu’tazilah was considered as 
a danger to the Muslim society. The conservative 
ulama’ regarded the rationalist movement as a 
destructive force. Therefore, in order to preserve the 
social integrity of Islam, they made the structure of 
their legal system as rigorous as possible. They did 
not regard ijtihad to be a source of advancement of 
thought or knowledge. Second, the rise and growth 
of ascetic Sufism which gradually developed under 
the influence of a non-Islamic character turned the 
great Muslim intellectuals into sufis who confined 
themselves to the preservation of faith and beliefs. 
When such extremes penetrated into the Muslim 
society, the independent thinking and the spirit of 
ijtihad, according to Iqbal, gradually deteriorated 
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and decayed. Third, Iqbal pointed out that the 
destruction of Baghdad, which was the centre of 
Muslim intellectual life was responsible for the 
decay of ijtihad up to the second half of the thirteenth 
century. It caused the Muslim community to think 
pessimistically about the future of Islam. 
Iqbal paid a tribute to Ibn Taymiyyah, the 
great Islamic scholar of later thirteenth century, 
who revolted against the finality of the schools of 
Islamic law. On similar ground, Iqbal rejected the 
idea of closing the doors of ijtihad and claimed 
that the founders of the Islamic legal schools never 
claimed finality for themselves or their judgments. 
Therefore, he strongly advocated the practice of 
ijtihad in modern contemporary times, at the same 
time reminded any reform movement to practice it 
in a proper guideline. 
In his approach of legislation, Iqbal emphasized 
it on the elements of permanence and change. He 
believed that the legal system of Islam must admit 
changes within its framework without deviating from 
its fundamental principles. He said, “the ultimate 
spiritual basis of all, as conceived by Islam, is external 
and reveals itself in variety and change” (Iqbal 1982). 
According to Iqbal, only religious obligations are 
permanent and cannot be changed, such as, the times of 
prayer and the period of fasting during Ramadan. On 
the other hand, worldly affairs (muamalat) are subject 
to the law of change. It includes all laws pertaining to 
civil and criminal matters, which can be changed and 
reinterpreted in accordance with changing condition 
and needs as well as the requirements of the Muslim 
community (Muhammad al-Tahir ibn Ashur 1988). 
As the principle of movement in Islam, ijtihad is the 
means whereby changes can be affected in the laws 
of Islam, provided they are not inconsistent with the 
basis on which the system rests. Therefore, Islamic 
law should not be viewed as an unalterable code. 
It is necessary to be changed in order to meet the 
requirements of modern society. Iqbal stated, “the 
claim of the present generation of Muslim liberals to 
reinterpret the fundamental legal principles in the light 
of their own experience and the altered conditions 
of modern life is, in my opinion, perfectly justified” 
(Iqbal 1982).
Iqbal is strongly opposed to the criticism that 
Islamic law or shariah is stationary and incapable 
of evolution. In view of the dynamic teachings of 
the Quran, Iqbal saw no justification for a situation 
whereby people are moving, but the laws remain 
stationary. It is perfectly justified for Muslims to 
interpret the rules of shariah in accordance with 
the needs and circumstances of the people. He 
highlighted, “the teaching of the Quran that life 
is a process of progressive creation, necessitates 
that each generation, guided by the work of its 
predecessors, should be permitted to solve its own 
problem” (Iqbal 1982).
Iqbal regarded Sayyidina Umar ibn al-Khattab 
as the first Muslim innovator because of the changes 
he introduced, particularly his inclusion of istihsan 
into the Islamic law of inheritance. Sayyidina 
Umar received many objections for introducing 
new perspectives into the legal code; however, he 
defended them and replied that there are two types of 
innovation, bidah hasanah and bidah sayyiah. Iqbal 
endorsed the former and considered it a positive or 
commendable innovation. He said, “a commendable 
innovation is worthy of consideration and should be 
adopted as a methodology for modern-day ijtihad” 
(Javaid Iqbal 1997).
Islam gives a practical and progressive code 
of social conduct and discourse. The social order 
of Islam, in its true spirit, remains responsive to 
the material and cultural forces. In this way, the 
importance of ijtihad cannot be over emphasized. 
Iqbal rejected the rigidity of thinking in conservative 
ulama’ and disapproved of their uncritical vision of 
the past; rather pleaded for a return of the spirit of 
ijtihad in the interpretation of the law. In fact, he 
regarded ijtihad as one of the dynamic elements and 
creative spirit of Islam.
Ijtihad is defined as the total expenditure of 
effort by a jurist to infer, with a degree of probability, 
the rules of shariah from their detailed evidence 
in the sources (Ali ibn Abi Ali Al-Amidi 1986 and 
Muhammad ibn Ali al-Shawkani 1920). Some ulama’ 
have defined ijtihad as the application by a jurist of 
all his faculties either in inferring the rules of shariah 
from their sources, or in implementing such rules and 
applying them to particular issues (Muhammad Abu 
Zahrah 1958). Iqbal defined ijtihad as to exert with a 
view to form an independent judgment but not to be 
independent of the Quran and Sunnah. He opposed 
freedom of thought which makes man deviate from 
Divine guidance but endorsed the freedom of ijtihad 
to oppose rigidity and stagnation. Iqbal mentioned 
two consequences of the freedom of ijtihad claimed 
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by modern Muslim movements; their revolt against 
the finality of the schools, and their assertive stand 
on the right of private judgment (Iqbal 1982). When 
he talked about the freedom of ijtihad or independent 
judgment, Iqbal did not regard any independent 
judgment to be ijtihad, rather he believed that it 
must be exercised by those who have knowledge 
and whose character can be fully relied upon. In 
his emphasis on the qualifications of exercising 
ijtihad, Iqbal explained in his Reconstruction, “It is 
the duty of the leaders of the world of Islam today to 
understand the real meaning of what has happened in 
Europe, and then to move forward with self-control 
and a clear insight into the ultimate aims of Islam 
as a social policy” (Iqbal 1982).
Then, Iqbal suggested certain qualifications as 
follows;
1. Knowledge of Islam, deep understanding of the 
ultimate aims of its ideology, institutions and 
politics.
2. Understanding of the modern problems that beset 
the Muslim world.
3. Closeness to the Prophet’s way and understanding 
of his methods and approach.
4. Reliable moral character so that decisions may 
be looked upon with respect.
Since there is an acute shortage of such 
specialists who are qualified to exercise ijtihad, 
Iqbal observed that a committee of people should be 
formed which includes Islamic scholars as well as 
those who have a good knowledge of contemporary 
problems and possess true Islamic character. 
Through their combined efforts, they will be able 
to make some contributions to the reconstruction 
of the Islamic law as well as fulfilling on an 
important need of society (Muhammad Hamid 1980). 
Therefore, Iqbal suggested that the ulama’ should 
be nominated to constitute a vital part of legislative 
assembly, helping and guiding discussions on 
questions relating to law, along with contribution 
from laymen who may happen to possess a keen 
insight into affairs. A body of ulama’ is needed as 
the assembly may face difficulties in understanding 
intricate points of fiqh. In this way, they will reduce 
the possibility of erroneous interpretation. At the 
same time, Iqbal suggested that the only effective 
remedy for eliminating the possibility of erroneous 
interpretation is to reform the present system of legal 
study in the universities of Muslim countries, to 
extend its sphere and to combine it with an intelligent 
study of modern jurisprudence (Iqbal 1982).
Iqbal clearly proposed the idea of transforming 
the right of ijtihad from individuals to a legislative 
assembly, which then should be the sole law-making 
body on the ground of expediency. However, his 
idea of removing the right of ijtihad from individual 
jurists (mujtahidun) to an elected Muslim assembly 
or parliament or majlis al-shura was strongly opposed 
by the conservative ulama’. 
Last but least Iqbal mentioned four sources of 
ijtihad; Quran, hadith, ijma’, and qiyas, in order 
to prove the possibility of evolution within Islamic 
law when meeting new situations. All those sources 
contain within them the potentialities of evolution 
when meeting new situations. Therefore, it is 
important to highlight Iqbal’s views on these sources 
of ijtihad for the purpose of illustrating the flexibility 
of Islamic law or shariah. 
Qur’an as the first source of ijtihad, according 
to Iqbal, contains not merely substantive legal 
provisions, but also indicates the means by which it 
is to be interpreted and supplemented. For example, 
the Quran insists that the Muslims should abide 
by the decisions of the Prophet (p.b.u.h) whenever 
some differences arise among them. Moreover, 
Iqbal regarded Quran as an embodiment of both 
the lofty moral principles and positive legal rules. 
The uniqueness of this two-fold nature of the Quran 
ensured the satisfaction of the needs of people. To 
Iqbal, Judaism and Christianity got deteriorated and 
corrupted due to the violation of the unity of these two 
things; the former became confined to legality and the 
later to asceticism and other-worldliness. Apart from 
setting the codes of law for guidance of the people, 
the Quran endows man with a revolutionary outlook 
and awakens him with a unique insight into life, so 
that he may reform and refashion his entire life in 
accordance with the spirit of Islam. 
Iqbal was critical to tradition or hadith as the 
second source of ijtihad, He observed that hadith 
is not fully valid in changing times and places. On 
this ground, Iqbal highlighted that Abu Hanifah, the 
founder of Hanafi school of law did not practically 
make use of the hadith but preferred to use istihsan. 
However, Iqbal did not mean to reject the validity of 
hadith altogether; rather suggested that the study of 
hadith must be taken more seriously and critically. 
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The third source of ijtihad is ijma’, and Iqbal 
considered it as the most important legal notion 
in Islam. It is a process through which new values 
are established and preserved in Islam. In ijma’, 
the mujtahidun agreed on a point of law and such 
a consensus becomes a permanent source of law. 
Iqbal supported exercise of ijma’ through legislative 
assemblies and gave its power to both the ulama’ 
and the modern lawyers. He was conscious of the 
misleading and narrow interpretation of the non 
ulama’, therefore, insisted on the vital participation 
of the ulama’ in the Muslim legislative assembly. 
The last source of ijtihad elucidated by Iqbal is 
qiyas or analogical reasoning which is the process 
of applying Islamic principles to local problems or 
to changing conditions. Iqbal mentioned some of 
the early jurists who practiced qiyas particularly 
Abu Hanifah. He said Abu Hanifah made a great use 
of analogical reasoning in view of changing socio-
economic conditions, which arose by the extension of 
Muslim states. In fact, Iqbal viewed the school of Abu 
Hanifah as the greater power of creative adaptation 
than any other schools of shariah.
Iqbal’s discussion of the sources of ijtihad clearly 
showed that the legal system of Islam has the potential 
to grow and evolve. It has the capability of meeting 
the rising needs of our age as well as to transform a 
modern society into an Islamic way of life. 
IQBAL’S FRAMEWORK OF SHURA IN 
RELATION TO IJTIHAD
During the nineteenth century, the advocates of 
modernism throughout the Muslim world agreed that 
the primary reason behind the backwardness of the 
Muslim world was embedded in the despotic political 
system, which was based on one individual’s will 
and denying the rights of the ummah. They believed 
that the only possible cure for the problems arising 
in the Muslim ummah was to return to the institution 
of shura, and the participation of the learned 
scholars as representatives of the community in the 
administration of government. Thus, the significance 
of shura was raised in the mid-nineteenth century by 
prominent leaders of reformist thought. They argued 
that in order to implement Islam in the public sector, 
rule must be established in accordance with the will 
of the people. For example, Jamal al-din Afghani, 
contended that without the participation of the people 
in government, Muslim states cannot withstand the 
pressures of the West. Besides, rules without public 
support and confidence give in too easily to the 
demands of Western powers. Iqbal’s ideas on shura 
represented a continuation from previous ideas of 
reformists giving a deeper understanding on how 
to revive the concept of shura and to abrogate the 
authoritative political systems. For Iqbal, a political 
system based on the general will of the people which 
is called Parliament is the best possible solution to 
cure the problem of stagnation among Muslims.
Shura is one of the most important Islamic 
constitutional principles. It is derived from the 
Arabic word shawara which means ‘to extract 
honey from the small hollow in the rock in which it 
is deposited by the wild bees or honey (Muhammad 
ibn Mukarram al-Ansari ibn Mansur 1965), or to get 
it from hives and other places. There are different 
definitions of shura in its technical sense. For 
example, Ibn Arabi defined it as ‘a meeting on a 
matter on which one seeks the advice of another’ 
(Ali Muhammad al-Bajawi 1958). While Abu Ali 
al-Tabarsi explained shura as ‘a dialogue intended 
to obtain the truth’ (Abu Ali Amin al-Din al-Tabarsi). 
Our contemporary Muslim scholars have defined 
shura in a broader sense. According to Abdul 
Khaliq al-Duri, shura is ‘to evaluate the opinion of 
experienced people in certain affairs so as to direct us 
to the position which is closest to the truth’ (Qahtan 
Abdul Rahman al-Duri 1974). 
Historically, shura has been practiced since the 
life time of the Prophet and his rightly caliphs who 
applied shura in all social networks as well as in their 
process of decision making in the Islamic state of 
Madinah. It even played a vital role in the political 
development of the early Islamic state. In line with 
the practice of shura in Islamic history, Iqbal affirmed 
the necessity of its application in contemporary time. 
This section is going to highlight Iqbal’s framework of 
shura which is confined to the governmental system, 
and which is a continuation of his discussion on the 
principle of ijtihad in the previous section. Ijtihad and 
shura are connected to each other and this connection 
existed during the period of pious companions and 
caliphates, but it ceased to exist in later times. That is 
the reason why Iqbal emphasized these two concepts 
in an attempt to evolve a political system based 
on Islamic ideals and values, rather than adopting 
Western constitutional principles.
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Regarding the field of shura, Ibn Taymiyyah has 
confined it to the things which are not covered by 
revelation. Moreover, the fundamental teachings of 
Islam that constitute the pillars of religion are not 
subject to shura (Ahmad ibn Abd al-Halim 1992). 
While Abduh claimed that the subject of shura is in 
all matters related to worldly affairs especially what 
is related to peace, war, politics, and economics 
(Ahmad Khallafullah Muhammad 1981). This 
includes all matters which are related to general 
policy as well as to other fields of worldly interest. 
According to Rashid Ridha, shura is applicable to 
all matters of shariah and religion (Muhammad 
Rashid Ridha 1973). Meanwhile, Maududi strongly 
emphasized that the primary field of shura is 
legislation (Abu ‘Ala Maududi 1960). Iqbal has been 
very much influenced by Maududi and applied shura 
more to the legislation of state. Clearly, shura has 
been discussed by most of the revivalist pioneers 
to show its prominent significance in the legal 
constitution of Islamic state. For instance, Rashid 
Ridha explained that the Muslim political system 
decayed because of the absence of shura. He claimed 
that ulil amr (people in authority) these days should 
consist of eminent scholars, chiefs of the army, 
distinguished merchants and agriculturists, leaders 
of political parties, medical doctors and lawyers in 
whom the nation has confidence and to whom they 
refer their difficulties.
The authority to interpret the shariah at the 
time of rightly guided caliphs lay with the ummah 
which means that people have a right and they 
should exercise their authority through their elected 
representatives. During the Ummayad and Abbasid 
periods, this right was taken away from the ummah 
and given to various sects and schools of fiqh. Thus, 
Iqbal wanted to bring back the concept of shura as 
practiced in the early period of Islam. He emphasized 
that the authority to interpret shariah is the right of 
the entire ummah. 
Iqbal defined shura as the opinion of the whole 
ummah with regard to affairs of common interest 
which are conducive to the healthy development 
of the state. According to him, the ummah should 
elect their representatives by means of a fair and 
impartial election and these representatives should 
carry out the duty of the interpretation of shariah. 
Therefore, Iqbal allocated the authority to interpret 
shariah to elected representatives in Parliament 
or majlis-al-shura. He gives two reasons why the 
authority for interpretation of shariah should only 
be made by elected representatives in Parliament. 
First, followers of different schools of fiqh are unable 
to perform ijtihad because they represent different 
point of views and may interpret shariah according 
to their own school of fiqh meanwhile shariah is 
for the entire Muslim community. Second, God has 
not delegated the right to interpret shariah to any 
person or any sect but He has bestowed it to the 
entire ummah (Guraya Muhammad Yusof 1987). 
However, Iqbal’s idea to remove the right of ijtihad 
from individual jurists to elected representatives in 
Parliament or majlis al-shura was strongly opposed 
by the conservative ulama’.  
Pertaining to the members of majlis al-shura, 
Iqbal emphasized that they should possess certain 
characteristics, thus, the task of shura should not be 
given to incompetent people who are unable to run 
the affairs of the state. In conformity with Islamic 
principles, Iqbal laid down the conditions for the 
members of majlis-al-shura;
1. He should possess a firm and profound belief in 
the tenets of Islam.
2. He should possess integrity of character.
3. He should have reasonable knowledge and 
necessary understanding of the job and 
responsibility which is being entrusted to him.
4. He should have not only a good intellectual 
personality, but also an impressive physical 
personality (Iqbal 1982).
Moreover, Iqbal added that the candidate 
must have the ability to understand the teachings 
of the Quran and the Sunnah, knowledge of 
modern science and disciplines, and knowledge of 
international and national problems. Since the duty 
to interpret shariah is given to the majlis-al-shura, 
the people will realize their responsibilities in the 
matter of electing such competent persons who 
can satisfactorily shoulder their responsibilities. 
Iqbal divided the tasks of majlis al-shura into three 
fields;
1. to amend existing laws so that they conform to 
Islamic injunctions.
2. to implement Islamic laws that are not being 
enforced, and
3. to establish new laws that are not repugnant to 
the injunctions of Islam (Iqbal 1982).
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In his framework of shura, Iqbal wanted to 
change the system used in the monarchial period 
in which the ummah was deprived of the right to 
collective legislation. Only a handful of jurists and 
kings used to perform ijtihad among them. For Iqbal, 
this is not possible in the present democratic era and 
he claimed the right of the entire nation to take part 
in this process. Undoubtedly, the legislative work is 
done by the Parliament or majlis-al-shura but when 
the bill is introduced to it, the entire nation along 
with its elected representatives takes part in it. The 
experts and laymen express their views about it; 
the information media provide many avenues for 
thoroughly thrashing out the issue, thus, everyone 
takes part in the legislation. For the shariah bill, 
the Parliament has to seek direction, guidance, and 
assistance from the views of all, and the fundamental 
teachings of the Quran and Sunnah must have been 
examined on from all angles. Iqbal emphasized 
that the knowledge and experience of all the 
experts, the jurists, and the judges who are exerting 
themselves over a problem are able to perform the 
task of interpreting the shariah. Although the right 
of interpreting the shariah is given to the Parliament, 
it does not mean that only the members carry out the 
duty. The process, according to Iqbal, will include 
participation by the entire nation for the discussions 
and debates will take place publicly over any issue. 
For Iqbal, public’s participation profoundly affects 
the deliberation of the Parliament, and no Parliament 
can ignore public opinion on an issue. Therefore, the 
collective thinking of the entire nation eventually 
takes the shape of a law. According to Iqbal, ijma’ 
was a democratic principle in which the right to 
legislate was not limited to a few individuals only 
but to the whole Muslim community. He said, “the 
transfer of the power of ijtihad from individual 
representatives of schools to a Muslim assembly 
is the only possible form ijma’ can take in modern 
times” (Iqbal 1982).
Iqbal reminded that majlis-al-shura is significant 
for the Muslims as he saw it the only possible 
legal form that ijma’ (consensus of opinion) can 
take in modern times. The religious scholars of all 
various sects could sit together in the legislative 
assemblies and thrash out their differences through 
ijma’. Iqbal is, however, doubtful whether such 
an exercise could be possible in the non-Muslim 
assemblies. Nevertheless, the question of non-Muslim 
participation in legislation has been highlighted by 
Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi. He observed that, “the jurists 
have permitted the possibility of ijtihad by a non-
believer and for a person who does not believe in 
the creator, does not believe in prophecy, and does 
not believe in shariah. The reason is that ijtihad has 
been based on the soundness of such premises which 
is not to be questioned. It does not matter whether 
one believes them to be actually true or not” (Abu 
Ishaq).
Thus, it is not the duty of a legislator to investigate 
or prove the validity of the premises used in legal 
reasoning. His duty is rather to take those premises as 
to be the basis of legal reasoning to proceed further. It 
does not matter whether he believes them to be true 
or not. Consequently, a non-Muslim may proceed in 
his legal reasoning without establishing the validity 
of premises. So far as the activity of legislation is 
concerned, the question of non-Muslim’s participation 
is immaterial.
On the other aspect, Iqbal has made a distinction 
between shura and democracy in which he condemned 
Western democracy which is devoid of religious 
guidance. Iqbal mentioned some basic principles of 
an Islamic state which are different from Western 
democracy. For instance, all decisions of an Islamic 
state are made due to the principles of shura by the 
means of ijtihad and ijma’. Muslims are entitled to 
make laws which are of public interest, keeping in 
view that such laws do not conflict with basic laws of 
shariah. Therefore, both Quran and sunnah always 
play the decisive role and are to be the main sources 
of ijtihad and ijma’ (Parveen Shaukat Ali 1970). 
Moreover, elections in Western democracy are held 
on the basis of adult irrespective of pre-requisites. 
This makes it possible for incompetent people to 
run the affairs of the state. Islam, on the contrary, 
has imposed certain restrictions on the suitability of 
candidates for different offices of the state. Islam also 
prevents any individual from nominating himself for 
state office or asking to be nominated to any official 
position. Furthermore, the representative member 
of majlis al-shura has a more difficult task than 
the representative member in Western democracy. 
He always speaks and acts on behalf of entire 
Muslims to present and to look after their interests 
in accordance to shariah. Therefore, he performs 
dual responsibilities to his electorates as well as 
to the Islamic Divine law (H.H Bilgrimi 1966). In 
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the Western democracy, however, a member of an 
Assembly or Congress or Parliament has a single 
responsibility which is to the electorate only.
CONCLUSION
Iqbal was highly critical of the contemporary Islamic 
thought which had become narrow, rigid, and static. 
He considered ijtihad to be the key to updating the 
legal, political, and social institutions of Islam. 
For him, ijtihad is the intellectual method to create 
an intellectual creativity among Muslims. Iqbal’s 
ideas are part of the continuing tradition of Muslim 
intellectuals’ concern about the problem of stagnation 
of religious thought among Muslims. He also rejected 
the classical concept of shura as being the exclusive 
privilege of the ulama’. He wanted to give it a new 
meaning by assuming shura as a consensus which 
should be derived from a parliamentary system 
of an Islamic state government. Iqbal’s attempt at 
enlargement of the scope of shura was to show 
the compatibility of Islam with the socio-political 
institutions of modern age. In addition, he wished 
to revive the democratic machinery of shura in 
operation during the period of rightly guided caliphs 
which has been demolished over the centuries. He 
observed that a modern legislative assembly or 
Parliament or majlis al-shura can become an agency 
for its performance. Although Iqbal was conscious 
of certain practical difficulties, such as, the lack of 
religious understanding and knowledge of Islamic 
law among the present legislators, he suggested 
the ways and means through which this principle 
could be implemented in the modern world. For 
example, he proposed to reform the present system 
of legal education in Muslim countries, to extend its 
scope, and to combine it with the study of modern 
jurisprudence. 
Iqbal presents ijtihad as a dynamic principle that 
keeps law responsive to the changing needs of society. 
However, his contribution to the new idea of ijtihad 
has not been fully appreciated. Some conservative 
Muslims regarded change as a defect, thus, they 
disagreed with Iqbal’s conception of ijtihad. In 
addition, Iqbal was also accused of being apostate and 
declared outside the pale of Islam. This accusation is 
unacceptable since Iqbal used the Quran and Sunnah 
to defend his arguments. It is also seen that the ummah 
favored Iqbal’s principle of ijtihad and believed that 
it was based on correct foundations. It is no doubt 
that his principle of ijtihad is quite controversial 
when he opposed the supremacy of a nominated 
religious advisory council over the elected parliament. 
However, his opposition to any nominated institution 
for the purpose of dealing with legislation should be 
justified. This is due to his basic reason that nominated 
person cannot go against the wills and wishes of the 
nominator. Obviously, every nominator would have 
his personal views on certain issues and the nominee 
tends to bring his voice. This scenario then would be 
against the collective interest of the nation. In that 
case, the shariah would come under their personal 
views. In such institutions, there is no chance for the 
entire nation to take part in the deliberations, unlike 
the parliament, where the entire nation, directly 
or indirectly, is involved in the deliberations. In 
conclusion, Iqbal has transformed the right of ijtihad 
from individual jurists to an elected Muslim assembly 
or Parliament, and even laid down the ground rules 
of ijtihad. The significance of Iqbal’s ideas of ijtihad 
was revealed by the constitutional developments in 
Pakistan, particularly, in relation to the role of ulama’. 
The debate whether this role should be participative 
or recommendatory still continues, but Pakistan is 
gradually moving towards Iqbal’s idea that it should 
be participative.
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